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poet, not to begin his epic a t  the origin of 
things, but to hasten on to the event 
proper ;consequently, I shall not go back 
to the Egyptians, Greeks, Hindoos, or 
Arabs, but a t  once proceed to the advances 
made in the present century. 
One of the first results of the differential 
notation of Leibnitz was the recognition of 
d
the analogy between - the symbol of dif- dx 

ferentiation and the ordinary symbol of al- 
gebra; later the same analogy was per-
ceived to hold for A ,  the symbol of the 
calculus of finite differences. Guided by 
this analogy, Lagrange and other mathe-
maticians of the French school, which flour- 
ished a t  the beginning of the century, in- 
ferred that theorems proved to be true for 
combinations of ordinary symbols of quan- 
tity might be applied to the differential 
calculus and the calculus of finite differ-
ences. I n  this way many theorems were 
enunciated, which appeared to be true, but 
of which i t  was thought to be almost im- 
possible to obtain direct demonstration. 
Gradually, however, the view was reached 
that the logical connection amounted to 
more than analogy, and that the common 
theorems were true because the symbols in 
the three cases were subject to the same 
fundamental laws of combination. This 
advance was principally made by Servais, 
who enunciated the laws of commutation 
and distribution. 
About the year 1812 a school of mathe- 
maticians arose a t  Cambridge which aimed 
a t  introducing the d-ism of the Continent 
in place of the dot-age of the University; 
in other words they believed in the practi- 
cal superiority of the differential notation 
of Leibnitz over the fluxional notation of 
Newton. Their attention was naturally 
drawn to the questions which had sprung 
from the differential notation ; and of the 
three founders of the school-Babbage, 
Herechel, Peacock-the last named took 
up the problem of placing the teaching of 
algebra more in consonance with the views 
which had been reached of the nature of 
symbols. Peacock considered algebra, as  
then taught, to be more of an art than a sci- 
ence; a collection of rules rather than a 
system of logically connected principles ; 
and with the object of placing i t  on a more 
scientific basis, he made a distinction be- 
tween arithmetical algebra and symbolical 
algebra. He  treated these names as denot- 
ing distinct sciences, and he wrote an alge- 
bra in two volumes, of which one treats of 
arithmetical algebra and the other of sym- 
bolical algebra. He thus describes what 
he means by the former term : ( (  I n  arith- 
metical algebra we consider symbols as  rep- 
resenting numbers 'and the operations to 
which they are submitted as  included in 
the same definitions as in common arith-
metic ; the signs + and - denote the op- 
erations of addition and subtraction in 
their ordinary meaning only, and those op- 
erations are considered as impossible in all 
cases where the symbols subjected to them 
possess values which would render them so 
in case they were replaced by digital num- 
bers ; thus in expressions such as a -j- b we 
must suppose a and b to be quantities of the 
same kind ; in others like a - b, we must 
suppose a greater than 6 and therefore 
homogeneous with i t ;  in products and quo- 
a
tients, like u b and ----we must suppose the b 
multiplier and divisor to be r,bstract num-
bers ; all results whatsoever, including 
negative quantities, which are not strictly 
deducible as legitimate conelusions from 
the definitions of the several operations 
must be rejected as impossible, or as  for- 
eign to the science." 
Here it may be observed that Peacock is 
a 
not true to his own principle ; for - is as  b 
impossible when b is not a divisor of a, as is 
a - b, when b is not less than a ; in neither 
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case do we get a digital number. I-Ie draws 
the line so as to exclude the fraction as a 
multiplier but not as a multiplicand ; accord-
ing to his own principle it should be wholly 
excluded from arithmetical algebra. But 
arithmetic so restricted would be a very nar- 
row science, and the logical result would be 
to divide arithmetic itself into an  arithmet- 
ical arithmetic and a symbolical arithmetic. 
He  then describes what he means by
' symbolical algebra.' "Symbolical algebra 
adopts the rules of arithmetical algebra but 
removes altogether their restrictions ; thus 
symbolical subtraction differs from the 
same operation in arithmetical algebra in 
being possible for all relations of value of 
the symbols or expressions employed. All 
the results of arithmetical algebra which 
are deduced by the application of its rules, 
and which are general in form, though par- 
ticular in value, are results likewise of sym- 
bolical algebra, where they are general in 
value as well as in form ; thus the product 
of a" and a" which is am+"when m and n 
are whole numbers, and therefore, general 
in  form, though particular in value, will be 
their product likewise when m and n are 
general in vaiue as *ell as in form ; the 
series for ( a  + b)" determined by the prin- 
ciples of arithmetical algebra when n is any 
whole number, if i t  be exhibited in a gen- 
eral form, without reference to a final term, 
may be shown upon the same principle to 
be the equivalent series for (a + b)" when 
n is general both in form and value." 
The principle here brought forward was 
named by Peacock the ' principle of the 
permanence of equivalent forms '; by means 
of it the transition is made from arithmet- 
ical algebra to symbolical, and a t  page fi9 
of 'Symbolical Algebra ' i t  is thus enun-
ciated : Whatever algebraical forms are 
equivalent, when the symbols are general in 
form but specific in value, will be equiva- 
lent likewise when the symbols are general 
in  value as well as in  form." 
One asks naturally, What  are the limits 
set to the generality of the symbol ?' Pea-
cock's answer is, 'Whatsoever.' I n  the 
theory of reasoning the great question is 
not, ' How do we pass from generals to par- 
ticulars ?' but < HOW do we pass from par- 
ticulars to generals?' The application of 
general principles is plain enough-the 
difficulty is in explaining how we arrive a t  
the truth of the general principles. The 
logician, seeking for light on this question, 
is apt to turn to exact science, and es-
pecially to algebra, the most perfect branch 
of exact science. Should he turn to Pea- 
cock, he finds that all that is offered him is 
this ' principle of the permanence of equiva- 
lent forms'; which, paraphrased, amounts 
to the following : We find certain theorems 
to be true when the symbol denotes in- 
teger number; let these theorems be true 
without restriction, and let us try to find 
the different interpretations which may be 
put on the symbol. I s  not the following 
attitude more logical? We  find certain 
theorems to be true, when the symbol de- 
notes number ;how fctr and no further may 
the conception of number be generalized, 
yet these theorems remain true without any 
alteration of form P ;  and, should the con- 
ception of number be still further general- 
ized, what is the modified form which the 
theorems then assume? This is the logical 
process of generalization, whereas Peacock's 
process is " essentially arbitrary, though 
restricted with a specific view to its opera- 
tions and their results admitting of such 
interpyetations, as may make its epplica- 
tions most generally useful." (Report on 
Recent Progress in Analysis, p. 194.) 
The two processes may be illl~strated by 
their application to the binomial theorem, 
proved to be true for a positive integer 
index. According to Peacock's process, 
318 SC'IENCE. [N. S. VOL. X. NO. 246. 
is to be made a theorem in symbolical 
algebra, whether the series be finite or in- 
finite, and all tha t  remains is to find the  
different ways in which i t  may be inter- 
preted. The  process of generalization pro- 
ceeds by steps. For instance, i t  asks : Will 
the  series retain the same form when n is 
generalized so as  to include any rational 
fraction? This is one of the  questions 
which Newton proposed to himself, and 
settled in the  affirmative; and i t  is re-
corded that lie verified the  t roth  of his 
conclusion by squaring the series for 
(1- x2)+. Peacock's principle does not 
distinguish divergent from convergent 
series; i t  is nothing but hypothesis, and 
any result suggested by i t  must stand the 
test of independent investigation. 
An important advance in  the  philosophy 
of the  fundamental principles of algebra was 
made by D. F. Gregory, a younger member 
of the Cambridge school of matl-iematician~. 
Descended from a Scottish family, already 
famous in the  annals of science, lie early 
gave promise of adding additional luster to 
the name ; this he accomplished in  a brief 
life of thirty-one years. I n  1838 he read a 
paper before the Royal Society of Edin- 
bnrgh On the Real Nature of Symbolical 
Algebra,' in which he says : " The light i n  
which I would consider symbolical algebra 
is, tha t  i t  is the  science which treats of the  
combination of operations defined not by 
their nature, that  is, by what they are  or 
what they do, but by the laws of combina- 
tion to which they a re  subject. And as  
many different kinds of operations may be 
included in a class defined in the  manner 
I have mentioned, whatever can be proved 
of the  class generally, is necessarily true of 
all  the operations included under it. This, 
i t  may be remarked, does not arise from any 
analogy existing in the nature of the  opera- 
tions which may be totally dissimilar, but 
merely from the fact that  they are  all sub- 
ject to  the samelaws of combination. I t  is 
t rue  that  these laws have been in many 
cases suggested (as  Mr. Peacock has  aptly 
termed i t )  by the  laws of the known opera- 
tions of number;  but the  step which is 
taken from arithmetical to symbolical 
algebra is, tha t  leaving out of view the 
nature of the  operations which the symbols 
mre nse represent, we suppose the  existence 
of classes of unknown operations subject to 
the same laws. TVe are  thus able to prove 
certain relations between the different 
classes of operatioas, which, when ex-
pressed between the symbols are called 
algebraical theorems. And if we can show 
that any operations in any  science are sub- 
ject to  the  same laws of combination as  
these classes, the  theorems are  true of these 
as  included in the  general case ; provided 
always tha t  the resulting combinations are  
all possible in the  particular operation 
under consideration ." 
It  will be observed tha t  he places algebra 
on a formal basis ; for its symbols are  de-
fined, not to represent real operations, but 
by laws of combination arbitrarily chosen. 
I n  a subsequent paper, however, entitled 
On a Difficulty in the  Theory of Algebra,' 
lie practically gave up the formal view, and 
appears inclined to  adopt the realist view 
instead. H e  says : '<I n  previous papers 
on the theory of algebra I have maintained 
the  doctrine that  a symbol is  defined alge- 
braically when its laws of combination are  
given ; and that  a, symbol represents a given 
operation when the laws of combination of 
the  latter a re  the same as  those of the 
former. This, or a similar theory of the  
nature sf algebra seems to be generally en- 
tertained by those who have turned their 
attention to  the  subject; but  without in  
any  degree leaning on it ,  we may say t ha t  
symbols are  actually subject to certain laws 
of combination, though we do not suppose 
them to be so defined ; and tha t  a symbol 
representing any operation must be subject 
to the  same laws of combination as the  
operation i t  represents." This is a depar- 
ture from conventional definitions to rules 
founded upon the universal properties of 
that  which is represented, 
I n  the paper first quoted, Gregory con-
siders five classes of operations. He  sup- 
poses + and - to be defined by the rules 
of signs ; and he finds in arithmetic a pair 
of operations which come under it, namely, 
addition and subtraction ; and in geometry 
another pair, namely, turning through a 
circumference, and a semi-circumference re- 
spectively. But i t  is instructive to note 
that  the difficulty referred to in the title of 
%he later paper is none other than the view 
that + and - represent the operations of 
addition and subtraction ; and he there 
shows that addition (including subtraction) 
is subject to a couple of very different 
laws, the commutative and the associative, 
though he does not use the latter term. It 
may be observed that the rule of signs ap- 
plies to x and + also; hence if + and - em-
braced addition and subtraction, so would x 
and s. The truth of the matter is that in 
ascending from arithmetic to algebra, we re- 
place the coBrdinate ideas of addition and sub-
traction by the more general idea of sum and 
the subordinate functional idea of opposite. 
Similarly the coordinate ideas of multiplica- 
tion and division are replaced by the more 
general idea of a product and the subordinate 
functional idea of ree@rocal. The symbols 
- and + then denote opposite and recipro- 
cal respectively, while the ideas of sum and 
product are not expressed by symbols, but 
a re  sufficiently indicated by the manner of 
writing of the several elements. This dif- 
ficulty appears to have upset his belief in 
the existence of classes of operations sub- 
ject to the same laws of combination, yet 
totally dissimilar in nature, and without 
any real analogy binding them together. 
According to Gregory, the second class 
of operations are index operations, subject 
to the two laws : 
f,(a)f,(u) =f,+,(a) and fm f.(a) =fmn(u).. 
The third class comprises the ordinary sym- 
bol of algebra, and the symbols d and A of 
the calculus ; they are subject to the dis- 
tributive law 
f (u> + f ( b )  = f ( u  + b) ,  
and to the law 
f ~ f ( a )= . f f ~ ( a > .  
The fourth class comprises the logarithmic 
operations subject to the law 
f ( ~ >+ f ( b>  =f (ab) .  
The fifth class are the sine and cosine func- 
tions, subject to the laws expressed by the 
fundamental theorem of planetrigonometry, 
namely, the connection between the sine 
and cosine of the sum of two angles and 
the sines and cosines of the component 
angles. 
Following as far as may be the chrono- 
logical order, we come next to Augustus De 
Morgan, distinguished for his contributions 
alike to logic and to mathematics. I n  his 
'Formal Logic ' he takes a formal view of 
the nature of reasoning in general, and in 
his 'Trigonometry and Double Algebra ' he 
lays down an excessively formal foundation 
for algebra. Indeed, i t  ma,y be said that  
he carries formalism to its logical issue; 
and, thereby, he renders a service, for its 
inadequacy then becomes the better evident. 
I n  the chapter of the book mentioned, 
which is headed, 'On Symbolic Algebra,' 
he thus expresses the view he had arrived 
a t  : I n  abandoning the meanings of sym- 
bols, we also abandon those of the words 
which describe them. Thus addition is to 
be, for the present, a sound void of sense. 
I t  is a mode of combination represented by 
+;when + receives its meaning, so also 
will the word addition. I t  is most impor- 
tant that the student should bear in  mind 
that, with one exceptiod, no word nor sign of 
arithmetic or algebra has one atom of 
meaning throughout this chapter, the ob-
ject of which is symbols, and their laws of 
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combination, giving a symbolic algebra 
which may hereafter become the grammar 
of a hundred distinct significant algebras. 
I f  any one were to assert that + and -
might mean reward and punishment and 
A, B, C, etc., might stand for virtues and 
vices, the reader might believe him, or con- 
tradict him, as he pleases, but not out 
of this chapter. The one exception above 
noted, which has some share of meaning, 
is the sign = placed between two symbols, 
a s  in A =B. I t  indicates that the two sym- 
bols have the same resulting meaning, by 
whatever steps attained. That A and B, if 
quantities, are the same amount of quantity, 
that if operations, they are of the same ef- 
fect, etc." Let us apply to the theory 
quoted the logical maxim that the excep- 
tion proves the rule, prove being used in 
the old sense of test. Well then, I say, 
because one symbol a t  least is found to be 
refractory to the theory, i t  follows that the 
theory is fallacious. 
De Morgan proceeds to give an inventory 
of the fundamental symbols and laws of al- 
gebra, that for the symbols being 0, l, +, 
-, x , +, ( ) ( )  and letters. With respect 
to it the following questions may be asked : 
Why should ( )(  be included, while the in- 
verse idea, denoted by log is left out ? What 
of the functional symbols sin and cos 3 Can 
they be derived from the above ? As - de-
notes opposite and + reciprocal, what are 
the signs for sum and product ? Can they 
be derived from the above ? 
His inventory of the fundamental laws is 
expressed under fourteen heads, but some 
of them are merely definitions. The laws 
proper may be reduced to the followin B,
which he admits are not all independent of 
one another : 
I. Law of signs: f+ = +, + -o r  
- + = - - - -
- +, 
x x = x ,  x + o r i x = i ,  + + = x .  
11. Commutative law : a + b = b + a, 
ab = bu. 
111. Distributive law : a(b  + e) = ab $ ac. 
IV. Index lamis : a' x a" aa+ ', 
(ab)' =a'", (ab)' = acbc. 
V. a - a=O ,  a s a = l .  
These last may be called the rules of re- 
duction. What Gregory gave was a classi- 
fication of the more important operations 
occurring in algebra ; De Morgan professes 
to give a complete inventory of the laws 
which the symbols of algebra must obey, 
for he says "Any system of symbols which 
obeys these rules and no others, except they 
be formed by combination of these rules, 
and which uses the preceding symbols and 
no others, except they be new symbols in- 
vented in abbreviation of combinations of 
these symbols, is symbolic algebra." 
Compare this inventory with Gregory's 
classification. De Morgan brings x and + 
under the same rule as  + and -; he ap- 
plies the commutative law to a sum as well 
as to a product ; he introduces the third in- 
dex law, which makes the index distribu- 
tive over the factors of the base ; he leaves 
out the logarithmic and trigonometrical 
principles and introduces what may be 
called the rules of reduction. From his 
point of view, none of them are rules ; 
they are laws, that is, arbitrarily chosen re- 
lations to which the algebraic symbols must 
be subject. H e  does not mention the law 
pointed out by Gregory, afterwards called 
the law of association. I t  is an unfortu- 
nate thing for the formalist that ab is not 
equal to ba , for then his commutative law 
would have full scope; as i t  is, the index 
operations prove exceedingly refractory, so 
that in some ofathe beautifully formal sys- 
tems they are left out of account altogether. 
Here already we have sufficient indication 
that to give an inventory of the laws which 
the symbols of algebra must obey, is as  am- 
biguous a task as to give an  inventory of 
the a priori furniture of the mind. 
Like De Morgan, George Boole was a 
mathematician who investigated and wrote 
in the field of logic. The character of the 
work done by the two men is very different. 
De Morgan's work bristles with new sym- 
bols ; Boole uses only the familiar symbols 
of analysis. The former polished many 
small stones ; the latter raised an edifice of 
grand proportions. The work done by Boole 
in applying mathematical analysis to logic 
necessarily led him to consider the general 
question of how reasoning is accomplished 
by means of symbols. The view which he 
adopted on this point is stated on page 68 
of the ( Laws of Thought.' 
"The conditions of valid reasoning by 
the aid of symbols are : First, that a fixed 
interpretation be assigned to the symbols 
employed in the expression of the data, 
and that the laws of the combination of 
these symbols be correctly determined from 
that interpretation ; Second, that the formal 
processes of solution or demonstration be 
conducted throughout in obedience to all 
the laws determined as above, without re- 
gard to the question of the interpretability 
of the particular results obtained ; Third, 
that, the final result be interpretable in 
form, and that i t  be actually interpreted in 
accordance with that system of interpreta- 
tion which has been employed in the ex-
pression of the data." 
As regards these conditions it may be ob- 
served that they incline toward the realist 
view of analysis. True, he speaks of inter- 
pretation instead of meaning, but it is a 
fixed interpretation ; and the rules for the 
processes of solution are not to be chosen 
arbitrarily, but are to be found out from 
the particular system of interpretation of 
the symbols. The thoroughgoing realist 
view is that a symbol stands for some 
definite notion in the subject analyzed, and 
that the rules of the analysis are founded 
upon universal properties of the subject an- 
alyzed. The realist view of mathematical 
science has commended itself to me ever 
since I made an exact analysis of relation-
ship and devised a calculus which provides 
a notation for any relationship ; can express 
in the form of an equation the relationship 
existing between any two persons, and pro- 
vides rules by means of which a single equa- 
tion may be transformed, or a number of 
equations combined so as to yield any rela- 
tionship involved in their being true simul- 
taneously. The notation is made to fit the 
subject, and the rules for manipulation are 
derived from uriiversal physiological laws 
and the more arbitrary laws of marriage. 
The basis is real ; yet the analysis has all 
the characteristics of a calculus, and throws 
light by comparison on several points in or- 
dinary algebra. I t s  fundamental symbol 
expresses a relation ; and what is the ulti- 
mate meaning of the algebraical symbol or 
of the symbol of the calculus but an opera- 
tion or relation ? 
I t  is Boole's second condition which prin- 
cipally calls for study and examination ; re-
specting i t  he observes as follows : ( 'The 
principle in question may be considered as 
resting upon a general law of the mind, the 
knowledge of which is not given to us 
u priori, i. e., antecedently to experience, but 
is derived, like the knowledge of the other 
laws of the mind, from the clear rna%nifesta- 
tion of the general principle in the partic- 
ular instance. A single example of reason- 
ing, in which symbols are employed in 
obedience to laws founded upon their inter- 
pretation, but without any sustained refer- 
ence to that interpretation, the chain of 
demonstration conducting us through inter- 
mediate steps which are not interpretable to 
a final result which is ,interpretable, seems 
not only to establish thevalidity of the par- 
ticular application, but to make known to 
us the general law nlanifested therein. No 
accumulation of instances ca,n properly add 
weight to such evidence. It may furnish 
us with clearer conceptions of that common 
elenlent of truth upon which the application 
of the principle depends, and so prepare the 
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way for its reception. It may, where the 
immediate force of the evidence is not felt, 
serve as  verification, a posteriori, of the prac- 
tical validity of the principle in question. 
But this does not affect the position af-
firmed, viz., that the general principle must 
be seen in the particular instance-seen to 
be general in application as well as true in 
the special example. The employment of 
the uninterpretable symbol d-rl in the 
intermediate processes of trigonometry fur- 
nishes an illustration of what has been said. 
I apprehend that there is no mode of ex-
plaining that application which does not 
covertly assume the very principle in ques- 
tion. But that principle, though not, as I 
conceive, warranted by formal reasoning 
based upon other grounds, seems to deserve 
a place among those axiomatic truths which 
constitute in some sense the foundation of 
general knowledge, and which may properly 
be regarded as expressions of the mind's 
own laws and constitution " (p. 68). 
We are all familiar with the fact that al- 
gebmic reasoning may be conducted through 
intermediate equations without requiring a 
sustained reference to the meaning of these 
ecluations ; but i t  is paradoxical to say that 
these equations can, in any case, have no 
meaning, no sense, no interpretation. It 
may not be necessary to consider their 
meaning ; i t  may even be difficult to find 
their meaning, but that they have a mean- 
ing is a dictate of common sense. I t  is en- 
tirely paradoxical to say that, as a general 
process we can start from equations having 
a meaning and arrive a t  equations having a 
meaning by passing through equations 
which have no meaning. The particular 
instance in which Boole sees the truth of 
the paradoxical principle is the successful 
employment of the uninterpretable symbol 
4-1 in the intermediate processes of trigo- 
-
nometry. As soon, then, as the d -1oc-
curring in these processes is demonstrated, 
the evidence for the principle fails. As a 
matter of fact, the doctrine of algebraists 
about d--i has long been a dark corner 
in exact science ; and as a consequence i t  
has been made the foundation for all sorts 
of crank theories. Recently I noticed that 
an ingenious individual had applied the 
4 3 and its successive powers to con-
struct a mathematical theory of sensation. 
Before the introduction by Descartes of the 
geometrical idea of the opposite the use of 
-in algebra might have been made the 
foundation for a similar transcendental 
theory of reasoning. Algebra, as the anal- 
ysis of quantity in space, has a clear mean- 
ing for d r 1as the operation of turning 
through a right angle round a definite or an 
indefinite axis ; in the forme? case it is vec- 
tor in nature, because the axis must be 
specified ; in the latter it is scalar in na-
ture, because the axis may be any suitable 
one. It follows that - denotes turning 
through two right angles, and this includes 
' opposite ' as a particular case. Thus an  
instance is still wanting on which to build 
the transcendental theory of ressoning 
enunciated by Boole. 
The object of Eoole's work, 'The Laws 
of Thought," is to investigate the funda- 
mental laws of thought, to give expression 
to them in the symbolical language of a cal- 
culus, and upon that foundation to establish 
the science of logic. I n  the concluding chap- 
ter he considers the light which the inquiry 
throws on the nature and constitution of 
the human mind. Now, as a matter of fact, 
the subject analyzed is quality, and its con- 
nection with the nature and constitution of 
the human mind is nowise more inanimate 
than is the connection of algebra the science 
of quantity. 
I t  is interesting to compare Boole's inven- 
tory of the symbols and laws for a calculus 
of reasoning (analysis of quality) with the 
inventory made by De Morgan for the sym- 
bols and laws of algebra (the analysis of 
quantity). The symbols are the same, ex- 
cepting that ( is omitted. The law of 
signs for + and - is the same, but none is 
given for x and s on account of the am- 
biguity of the reciprocal ; the commutative 
law applies to both sum and product ; the 
distributive law applies to the product of 
sums ; there are no index laws, excepting 
the peculiar one a" a. The law of reduc- 
tion a - a = 0 remains, but the comple- 
a
mentary law - = 1is not true in genera'l. 
a 
How is the truth or suitability of these 
laws established ? He  says that it would be 
mere hypothesis to borrow the notation of 
the analysis of quantity, and to assume that 
in its new application the laws by which its 
use is governed would remain unchanged ;to 
establish them he investigates the opera- 
tions of the mind in reasoning as expressed 
by language, and applies Kant's theory of 
seeing the general truth in a particular in- 
stance. As regards the commutative law i t  
may be remarked that Boole overlooks the 
fact that two notions may in their definition 
be coordinate with one another, or subordi- 
nate the one to the other, just as  in the theory 
of probability there is a difference between 
two events which are independent of one 
another, and two events which are dependent 
the one on the other ; and in  the latter case 
it is not true that the order of the notions 
is indifferent. This is not the place to enter 
into a discnssion of these so-called laws of 
thought ; I wish merely to point out that 
Boole's view is essentially that of the real- 
ist ; the fundamental rules of an  analysis 
are not to be assumed arbitrarily, but must 
be found out by investigation of the subject 
analyzed. 
Contemporaneously with Boole, and liv- 
ing on the same Emerald Isle, another 
mathematician spent many days reflecting 
on the fundamental principles of algebra- 
Sir W. R. Hamilton. His investigations 
started from the reading of some passages 
in Kant's ' Critique of the Pure Reason ' 
which appeared to justify the expectation 
that i t  should ' be possible to construct 
a priori a science of time as well as a science 
of space. The principal passage is as  fol- 
lows : " Time and space are two sources of 
knowledge from which various a priori syn-
thetical cognitions can be derived. Of this 
pure mathematics gives a splendid example 
in the case of our cognitions of space and 
its various relations. As they are both pure 
forms of sensuoug intuition, they render 
synthetical propositions a priori possible." 
Thus, according to Kant, space and time 
are forms of the intellect ; and Hamilton 
reasoned that, as geometry is the science of 
the former, so algebra must be the science 
of the latter. He  amplifies that view as 
follows : " I t  early appeared to me that 
these ends might de attained by consenting 
to regard algebra as  being no mere art, nor 
language, nor primarily a science of quan- 
tity, but ra,ther as the science of order in 
progression. It was, however, a part of 
this conception that the progression here 
spoken of was understood to be continuous 
and unidimensional, extending indefinitely 
forward and backward, but not in any lat- 
eral direction. And although the 'success- 
ive states of such a progression might, no 
doubt, be represented by points upon a line, 
yet I thought that their simple successive- 
ness was better conceived by comparing 
them with moments of time, divested, how- 
ever, of all reference to cause and effect ; 
so that the ' time ' here considered might be 
said to be abstract, ideal or pure, like 
that  ' space ' which is the object of geom- 
etry. I n  this manner I was led to regard 
algebra as  the science of pure time, and an 
essay containing my views respecting it as  
such was published in 1835." (Preface to 
'Lectures on Quaternions,' p. 2 . )  I f  a l ~  
gebra is based on any unidimensional sub- 
ject a difficulty arises in explaining the 
roots of a quadratic equation when they are 
imaginary. To get over the difficulty 
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Hamilton invented a theory of algebraic 
couplets, but the success of the invention is 
doubtful. I n  his presidential address be- 
fore the British Association the late Pro- 
fessor Cayley said that he could not ap- 
preciate the manner in which Hamilton 
connected algebra with the notion of time, 
and still less could he appreciate the man- 
ner in which he sconnected his algebraical 
couplet with the notion of time. Whether 
Hamilton has effected the explanation or 
not, i t  appears to be logically possible, for 
a complex quantity can be represented by 
two segments of one and the same straight 
line. 
But, be that as i t  may, Hamilton was led 
from algebraic couplets to algebraic triplets 
and to the problem of adapting triplets to 
the representation of lines in space. His 
guiding idea was to extend to space the 
mode of multiplication of lines in a plane 
already discovered by Argand, Warren 
and others ; and i t  was here that he stepped 
from the time basis to the space basis-that 
is, passed from a unidimensional to a tri-
dimensional subject, the latter including 
the former as  a special case. To his sur- 
prise, he found that the multiplication of 
two lines in space, either one being ex-
pressed in terms of three elements, led to a 
product composed not of three, but of fonr 
elements; and this result he deemed so 
novel and characteristic that he selected i t  
to give a name to the new method-' Qna-
ternions.' As finally developed, the method 
rests on a geouketrical basis; nevertheless i t  
is the logical generalization of ordinary 
algebra, for the distinctive theorems of 
algebra, such as the exponential, binomial 
and multinomial theorems, have their gen- 
eralized counterparts in quaternions. Since 
the time of Gauss, mathematicians have 
considered double or plane algebra to be 
the logical generalization of 'ordinary al-
gebra ; now .quaternions bears to plane al- 
gebra the same logical relation which plane 
algebra bears to ordinary algebra. It is all 
algebra in the sense of being the analysis of 
quantity and the relations of q~a~nti t ies .  
Any one who admits De Moivre's theorem 
into algebra is logically bound to admit 
quaternions as  the highest form of algebra. 
I t  is a common belief that quatercions has 
only a remote connection with algebra; 
that i t  is only one of several systems of non- 
commutative algebra, and that the mathe- 
matician han get on very well without it. 
But if the above is the true logical relation. 
then i t  must be the duty of every analyst to 
master its principles. I t  may be remarked 
here that the logical relation of quaternions 
to plane algebra is obscured by the preva- 
lent but erroneous idea that the complex 
quantities of the form x + iy represent vec- 
tors. They really represent, in their planar 
nzeaning, coaxial quaternions ; that is, x is 
a scalar and the axis of y is the common 
perpendicular to the plane. Let, as usual, 
w + ix + j y  + kz denote :t quaternion ; the 
complex qnantity is identical not with 
w + ix or ix +j y ,  but with w + kz. The 
fallacy in question almost baffled Hamilton 
in his attempts a t  generalization, as may be 
seen from the account which he gives of 
the discovery in the Philosophical Magazine 
for 1844. 
We shall obtatn additional insight into 
the nature of the fundamental laws of al-
gebra by considering the part which they 
played in the discovery of the qtlaternion 
generalization. I n  the endeavor to adapt 
the general conception of a triplet to the 
mtxltiplication of lines in space Hamilton 
started out with the principles of commu- 
tation, distribution and reduction ; but in  
order that ,the theorem about the moduli 
might rcmain true he  soon felt obliged, not 
indeed to abandon the principle of commu- 
tation entirely, but to rnodify i t  so as to 
preserve the order of the factors while leav- 
ing the order of combination of the factors 
commutable. This principle, which had 
previously been pointed out by Gregory as 
an  independent principle, he called the 
law of association. As the principle of 
commutation was still assumed to apply to 
the terms of a sum, it followed that the 
principle of a8ssociation also applied to 
them. Here, then, we hive an important 
difference in the inventory of the laws of 
algebra. According to De Morgan algebra 
follows a11 the laws which he enumerated, 
and them only; but Hamilton showed that 
the legitimate extension of algebra to space 
requires the commutative law to he modi- 
fied in the case of a product. And still 
further light is obtained on the nature of 
these laws by considering the way by 
which Hamilton satisfied himself of the 
truth of the principle of association. H e  
sought for and obtained a geometrical proof, 
independent of the principle of distribution, 
and depending on theorems taken from 
spherical trigonometry or spherical conics. 
Thus a notable generalization of algebra 
was made, not by arbitrary choice of fun- 
damental rules, nor by arbitrary extension 
of the rules for integer number, but by find- 
ing out the universal properties of the sub- 
ject analyzed. 
We have already found that the index 
operations form a valuable test of the 
soundness of any theory of algebra. If 
the method of qnaternions is the true ex- 
tension of algebra to space we expect i t  to 
throw new light on these operations. As a 
matter of fact, most of the works on quater- 
nions ignore the subject or present instead 
the treatment for the plane. I n  Hamil- 
ton's ' Elements of Quaternions ' there is a 
chapter headed 'On Powers and Logarithms 
of Diplanar Quaternions,' but what i t  con- 
tains is practically limited to the plane. 
Why ? Because the author believed, and 
there states, that the fundamental exponen- 
tial law is not true for diplanar quaternions ; 
that is, for space 
eP  x eq not = sp+q .  
The source of error lies in regarding the 
sum of indices as  commutative, for that 
amounts to holding that e p  x eq = eq x ep, 
which is contrary to the principles of 
quaternions. Were p + q a sum without 
any real order of the terms, then we might 
have an order of factors, that is, we might 
have 
But when the sum has n real order, of p, 
prior to q, then we cannot a t  the same time, 
hold that one factor p + q can be prior 
to another factor p + q ; for in the expan- 
sion we should have the contradiction of p 
being prior to q and q a t  the same time prior 
to p. Hence when p is prior to q the second 
power is not formed in accordance with 
the distributive principle; i t  ispa + 2pq + ql. 
When this is admitted khe exponential 
principle stands, but the commutative prin- 
ciple for a sum of such indices goes, a s  
does also the distributive manner of form-
ing the power of such a sum. 
As regards the third index law i t  is evi- 
dent from the non-commutability of the 
factors in general that in space i t  ceases to 
be true. The rule of reduction for a sum of 
terms requires to be modified when the 
terms have a real order ; for p + q - q =p, 
but q +p - q is not equal to p. The term 
and its opposite must follow one another 
immediately in order that the reduction 
may be legitimate. Similarly, in the case 
of a product the factor and its reciprocal 
must follow one another immediately in 
order that the reduction may be legitimate. 
From these principles the generalization for 
space of all the fundamental theorems of 
algebra follows without difficulty, and the 
theory of logarithms and exponent8 becomes 
the most fruitful part of quaternion analysis. 
We  may now consider briefly how the 
advance made by Hamilton struck a co-
temporary mathematician-Professor Kel-
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land, of the University of Edinburgh. It 
was his custom to teach the elements of 
quaternions to the students. of his senior 
class, and I remember how all went well till 
he came to multiplication, where the part 
played by a vector as a multiplier was 
likened, in some mysterious manner, to the 
action of a corkscrew. I n  the introductory 
chapter of the 'Introduction to Quater-
nions' he remaks as follows on the process 
by which algebra is generalized : " I t  is only 
by standing loose for a time to logical ac-
curacy that extensions in the abstract sci- 
ences-extensions a t  any rate which stretch 
from one science to another-are effected." 
And further on : "We trust, then, i t  begins 
to be seen that sciences are extended by the 
removal of barriers, of limitations, of condi- 
tions on which sometimes their very ex- 
istence appears to depend. Fractional 
arithmetic was an impossibility so long as 
multiplication was regarded as abbreviated 
addition; the moment an  extended idea 
was entertained, ever so illogically, that 
moment fractional arithmetic started into 
existence. Algebra, except as  mere sym- 
bolized arithmetic, was an impossibility so 
long as the thought of subtraction was 
chained to the requirement of something 
adequate to subtract from. The moment 
Diophantus gave i t  a separate existence- 
boldly and logically as  i t  happened-by 
exhibiting the law of minus in the forefront 
as  the primary definition of his science, that 
moment algebra in its highest form became 
a possibility, and indeed the foundation 
stone was no sooner laid than a goodly 
building arose on it." 
I t  seems to me that no greater paradox 
could be enunciated than to say that higher 
principles in exact science are reached by 
standing loose for a time to logical accuracy. 
HQWlong a time does that which is illogical 
take to become logical? The true process 
is, generalization, not illogical extension. 
No doubt, the generalized principle may a t  
first be merely an hypothesis, and in that  
form i t  may be applied so that i t  may be 
verified by its results ; but this is not 
standing loose to logical accuracy. 
The same author gives the following ac- 
count of how Hamilton extended algebra to 
space : l LHe had done a considerable 
amount of good work, obstructed as he was, 
when, about the year 1843, he perceived 
clearly the obstruction to his progress in the 
shape of an  old law which, prior to that 
time, had appeared like a law of common 
sense. The law in question i s  known a s  
the commutative law of multiplication. 
Presented in its simplest form i t  is nothing 
more than this : 'five times three is the 
same as three times five '; more generally 
it appears under the form of ab = ba what-
ever a and b may represent. When i t  came 
distinctly to the mind of Hamilton that this 
law is not a necessity-with the extended 
signification of multiplication he saw his 
way clear and gave up the law. The bar- 
rier being removed, he entered on the new 
science as a warrior enters a besieged city 
through a practicable breech." This ac-
count is, of course, inadequate, for Grass- 
mann jumped over the same barrier in the 
shape of an ' old law,' yet he was unable to 
deal with angles in space. There is no oc- 
casion to speak disrespectfully of the law of 
commutation ; i t  has its own place ;Hamil-
ton did not caat i t  aside as  an  obstruction ; 
he modified i t  for a product of factors hav- 
ing a real order, and the modified form 
amounts to the law of association. 
We shall now go back to another inde- 
pendent source of the development of the 
principles of algebra-Hermann Grass-
mann. Like his contemporary, Hamilton, 
he was remarkable alike for attainments in 
mathematics and philosophy, and, besides, 
he made important contributions to philol- 
ogy. No doubt specialists are necessary, 
but the investigation of the fundamental 
principles of a science requires one who is 
more than a specidist, one who has not 
only studied a portion minutely, but has 
also taken a comprehensive glance over the 
whole. From the preface to the Ausdeh- 
nungslehre of 1844 we get an  insight into the 
origin and development of his course of in- 
vestigation, and we find that it was in a 
manner the reverse of Hamilton's. The for- 
mer started from a variety of geometrical 
facts and developed a method which is in- 
dependent of space, and has perhaps suf- 
fered from itsphilosophische Allgemeinheit ;the 
latter started from general philosophical 
ideas and developed an algebra whioh is 
uniquely adapted to space of three dimen- 
sions. But, as  their subjects were largely 
the same, their results, so far as they in- 
volve truth, must also be capable of unifica- 
tion to a large extent. 
I n  the preface quoted, Grassmann informs 
us that he started from the treatment of 
negatives in geometry; he observed that 
the straight lines AB and BA were oppo- 
site, and that AB + BC =AC, whether the 
point C is beyond B or between A and B. 
This led him to the principle of geometrical 
addition-namely, that AB + BC =AC, 
whether A, B, C are in one straight line or 
not, I t  may be remarked here that this 
principle is all right so long as the compo- 
nents have no real order, such as forces ap- 
plied a t  a point or the coordillates of a 
point; but that i t  does not apply where the 
components have a real order, as, for ex-
ample, the sides of a polygon. I n  succes- 
sive addition the straight line from the ori- 
gin to the end of the polygon is the scalar 
result, but the area enclosed is another re- 
sult, whioh depends on the form of the path. 
Then turning to the product in geometry, 
he adopted the view that the parallelogram 
is the product of its two sides, whether 
these are a t  right angles or not. He  next 
found that the geometrical ideas of a sum 
.and a product which he had adopted satis- 
died the principle of distribution, but not 
the principle of commutation so far as the 
factors of a product were concerned. I n  
the case of the products commutation could 
be made, provided the sign of the product 
were changed also-that is, they were sub- 
ject to negative commutation. Another set 
of basal facts was taken from the doctrine 
of the center of gravity. He  observed that 
the center of gravity may be 'considered as 
the sum of several points, the line joining 
two points as the product of the points, the 
triangle as the product of its three points, 
and the pyramid as the product of its four 
points; and from these facts he developed a 
method similar to the ' Barycentric Calcu- 
lus,' of Mobius. 
He also considered the geometrical mean- 
ing of the exponential function. He ob- 
served that if a denote a finite straight line 
and a an angle in a plane through the line, 
then aea denotes the line a turned through 
the angle a. The treatment of angles in 
one plane is easy, but on attempting to 
treat of angles in space he encountered 
difficulties which he was unable to sur-
mount. This fact has been cited as  in-
dicating the superiority of Hamiltonls 
method ; while that is true, i t  must not be 
forgotten that Hamilton failed to generalize 
the exponential theorem. 
What is the view which Grassmann takes 
of the fundamental principles of algebra? 
An answer to this question is found in the 
introduotion to the Ausdehnzcngslehre of 1844. 
He  divides the sciences into the real and 
the formal ; the former treat of reality, and 
their truth consists in the agreement of 
thought with reality; the latter treat of 
thought only, and their truth consists in 
the agreement of the processes of thought 
with one another. Pure mathematics is 
the doctrine of forms. As a consequence 
he is obliged to place geometry under ap- 
plied mathematics, for i t  has a real subject, 
and should anyone think otherwise he must 
deduce from pure thought the tridimen-
sional character of space. Were space a 
form of thought, so would he time and mo- 
tion, and kinematics would also be a part 
of pure mathematics. So he relegates 
geometry to the real sciences, and he has a 
difficulty in retaining arithmetic even, for 
is it not based on axioms, whereas a formal 
science is based on conventions ? 
From the notion of the combination of 
terms he deduces that the placing of the 
brackets and the order of the terms may or 
may not be indifferent. There is a syn-
thetic combination and an  analytic combi- 
nation ; when the latter is unambiguous 
(that is, a - u = 0 )  then the placing of 
the brackets and the order of the terms is 
indifferent ; synthetic combination is then 
called addition, and the analytic subtrac- 
tion. Thus in Grassmann's view the com- 
mutative and associative laws are involved 
in the ideas of addition and subtraction. 
I t  may be observetl that the old difficulty 
with subtraction is due to the fact that i t  is 
not thoroughly commutative, and that it is 
only to the generalized idea of composition 
that the commutative law applies. Be-
sides, to define addition so as  to exclude 
terms having a real order is an arbitrary 
restriction of algebra. 
According to Grassmann's view multipli- 
cation is a combination of a .higher order; 
that is, he assumes as the definition of mul- 
tiplication the distributive principle in  the 
two-fold form 
( a +  b ) c= u c+  b c a n d c ( a+ b )  = cu + cb. 
I t  may be observed, however, that the true 
expression for the distributive principle is 
( a  + b) (c  + d )  = ac + ad + bc + bcl, . 
which assumes that if there is any real order 
of the terms there can be only one real order 
a b e d .  
As regards the laws of indices he says 
that involution is a combination of the 
the third order, and that for the sake of 
shortness he will omit all consideration of 
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it. Besides, its formal definition would be 
of no use, for in the nature of things i t  can 
be applied only in the special sciences 
through real definitions. This failure to 
treat of the index laws tells against his 
whole theory of the nature of algebra. I n  
fact, these laws are the touchstone where- 
by the soundness of any theory of the 
foundations of algebra may be tested. 
I n  1867 Hermann Hankel published his 
' Theory of Complex Numbers.' The full 
title of the work is Theorie der complexen 
Zahiensysteme insbesondere der yemeinen iqnar-
ginaren Zuhlen und cler Ha?nilto~z'schen Qz~ater- 
nionen nebst ihrer geonzetrischen Durstellung.' 
He had studied the writings of both Hamil- 
ton and Gmssmann, and the aim of the book 
is to give a complete theory of the several 
systems, uniting them all under the notion 
of complex number. From the title we 
gather that he considered the algebraic 
imaginaries and the Hamiltonian quater- 
nions as  two distinct systems, formal in 
their nature, but having a representation 
in space. He begins with positive integer 
numbers, and finds from a consideration of 
the notion that the addition of such num- 
bers satisfies the t v o  laws of association 
and commutation, which he treats as inde- 
pendent of one another. But as regards 
the notion of the multiplication of such 
numbers he says that the truth of the 
commutative law or of the associative law 
is not self-evident; that the fbrmer law can 
be proved by a geometric construction in a 
plane, and the latter by a geometric con-
struction in space. As regards the dis-
tributive law he says merely that i t  is a 
universal property of multiplication. As 
regards the base and index relation he 
says that neither the commutative law 
nor the associative law applies; he enun- 
ciates the same three index laws as De 
Morgan, but does not say whether they 
are self-evident or require a proof by geo- 
metric construction. Here, then, in a pro- 
fessedly scientific work, some of these fun- 
damental laws are treated as self-evident, 
others as  requiring geometric proof, and 
others yet are merely enunciated. If in 
the case of multiplication the commuta-
tive law requires proof, so does i t  also in 
the case of addition, for i t  is just as self? 
evident that 2 x 3 = 3 x 2 as that 2 + 3 
= 3 + 2 .  
The manner in which Hankel passes from 
arithmetic and arithmetical algebra to gen- 
era1 algebra is as  follows : Algebra, being 
formal mathematics, can be founded on any 
system of independent rules ; but, in order 
that its results may be interpretable and 
that  i t  may be capable of application, it is 
found convenient to choose the system of 
fundamental rules satisfied by common 
arithmetic ; in other words, the laws of in- 
teger arithmetic are made the laws of al- 
gebra. This he calls the ' principle of the 
permanence of the formal lams,' and enun- 
ciates as follows (p. 11) : " If  two expres- 
sions stated in terms of the general synlbols 
of arithmetical algebra (urithmetica mi-
versalis) are equal to one another they shall 
remain equal to one another when the 
symbols cease to denote simple magnitudes 
and the operations receive any other mean- 
ing." Peacock speaks of the permanence 
of equivalent forms ; Hankel of the perma- 
nence of the formal laws. Peacock says, 
' 'Let any general equivalence in arithmetical 
algebra be true also in universal algebra "; 
Elankel says, " Let the fundamental laws of 
the former be made the fundamental laws 
of the latter." Hankel gives a more scien- 
tific form to what was meant by Peacock. 
However, Hankel labors under a logical 
difficulty from which Peacock was exempt, 
for he does not take the laws of arithmetical 
algebra without exception ; he rejects the 
commutative law for a product, in order 
that quaternions may be included among 
his complex numbers. But, i t  may be asked, 
why not reject the commutative law for ad- 
dition also ? So h r  as arithmetical algebra 
is concerned they stand on the same basis. 
If, as has been shown, the1 sum of quater- 
nion indices is not com~nutative we are 
logically bound, on his principles, to rejec't 
the commutative rule for Iddition also. We  
are reduced to the a1tern:~tive : the choice 
of the fundamental rule6 is arbitrary, or 
else they must be founded on the properties 
of the sub<ject analyzed. The permanence 
. of the formal laws is n o t h i ~~g  but hypothesis, 
and in the case of any generalization must 
be tested by real investigation. 
One of the clearest thinkers on mathe- 
matical subjects in recent times was Pro- 
fessor Clifford, who like several of the 
mathematical philosophers we have spoken 
of, was cut down in the midst of his scien- 
tific activity. I n  his posthumous work en- 
titled 'The  Common Sense of the Exact 
Sciences ' there are chapters on number and 
quantity in which he explains his views of 
the fundamental principles of algebra. H e  
starts out from the principle, which he at- 
tributes to Cagley and Sylvester, that the 
number of any set of things is tlre same 
in whatever order we count them, and 
deduces from it, by means of diagrams, 
the commutative and associative rules for 
positive integer number. He  says that they 
amount to the following : " If  we can in- 
terchange any two consecutive things with- 
out altering the result then we may make 
any change whatever in the order without 
altering the result." It may be remarked 
that this ~hows  that the commutative and 
associative properties are not independent, 
but that  the former involves the latter. H e  
next shows, by a diagram, that the distribu- 
tive rule is true for the two forms a(b -j- c) 
= ab + ac and (b -)- c)a = ba $- ca, but he 
does not consider the complete form of the 
rule (a + b) (c + d) = ac -j- ad + bc + bd. 
As regards the impossible subtraction and 
division he s a ~ ~ s  "(p. 33) : Every opera- 
tion in mathematics that we can invent 
amounts to asking a question, and this 
question may or may not have an answer 
according to circumstances. If we write 
down the sj~mbols for the answer to the 
question in any of those cases where there 
is no answer, and then speak of them as if 
they meant something, we shall talk non-
sense. But this nonsense is not to be 
thrown away as useless rubbish. We have 
learned by very long and varied experience 
that nothing is more valuable than the non- 
sense which we get in  this way ; only it is 
to be recognized as nonsense, and by means 
of that recognition made into sense. We 
turn the nonsense into sense by giving a 
new meaning to the words or symbols which 
shall enable the question to have an answer 
that  previously had no answer." 
This is the truephenomenon in algebra; i t  
is more logical than its framer. How can i t  
be possible, unless the algebraist founds his 
analysis upon real relations ? I t  is the logic 
of real relations which may outrun the im- 
perfect definitions and principles of the 
analyst and make it necessary for him to 
return to revise them. 
To get over the impossible subtraction 
he introduces instead of the discrete unit 
supposed by number, the idea of a step, 
making plus mean ' forwards' and minus 
'backward.' The summing of steps is in- 
dependent of the order in which they are 
taken, and a minus step is just as inde- 
pendent as a plus step. When these sym- 
bols occur in multipliers he gives them, not 
the meaning of ' forwards' and 'backwards,' 
but that of ' keep7 and ' reverse. ' He gives 
them these meanings in addition to their 
former meanings, and leaves i t  to the con- 
text to show which is the right meaning in 
any particular case. I t  may be remarked 
that i t  is doubtful whether in any case two 
distinct meanings can be given to a symbol 
a t  one and the same time without produc- 
ing confusion. I t  seems to me, as already 
stated, that the most general meanings of 
+ and - are the angular ideas of au even 
and an  odd number of semi-circumferences, 
but this reduces in certain cases to the linear 
ideas of direct and opposite. 
From the idea of step he passes to the 
idea of operation, on the theory that a prod- 
uct may be composed either of a step and 
an  operation or of two operations. As a 
matter of fact, an operation is merely a 
relationship which may subsist between 
two quantities ; and we may have two dis- 
tinct products, one expressing a related 
quantity, the other a compound relation-
ship. The analysis of operations is a special 
part of the more general analysis of rela- 
tionships. According to Clifford's view, 
because a sum of operations of the kind 
considered is independent of the order of 
the operations, i t  follows that 
a + b = b + a  ab = ba 
a (b  + c )  = ab + ac ( a  + b )c  = ac + bc. 
As regards the advance from numbers to 
quantity he says (' Philosophy of the Pure 
Sciences,' p. 240): " For reasons too long 
to give here, I do not believe that the pro- 
visional use of unmeaning arithmetical 
symbols can ever lead to the science of 
quantity ; and I feel sure that the attempt 
to found i t  on such abstractions obscures its 
true physical nature. The science of num- 
ber is founded on the hypothesis of the dis- 
tinctness of things ; the science of quantity 
is founded on the totally different hypothe- 
sis of continuity. Nevertheless, the rela- 
tions between the two sciences are very 
close and extensive. The scale of numbers 
is used, as we shall see, in forming the men- 
tal apparatus of the scale of quantities, and 
the fundamental conception of equality of 
ratios is so defined that i t  can be reasoned 
about in terms of arithmetic. The opera- 
tions of addition and subtraction of quanti- 
ties are closely analogous to the operations 
of the same name performed on numbers, 
and follow the same laws. The composi- 
tion of ratios includes numerical multipli- 
cation as a particular case, and combines 
in the same way with addition and subtrac- 
tion. So close and far-reaching is this anal- 
ogy that the processes and result's of the two 
sciences are expressed in the same language, 
verbal and symbolical, while no confusion 
is produced by this ambiguity of meaning, 
except in the minds of those who try to 
make familiarity with language do duty for 
knowledge of things." 
What  is the analogy here spoken of?  It 
cannot be a mere rhetorical analogy ; i t  is a 
true logical analogy. But what is a logical 
analogy, except that  the subjects have some- 
thing in common, which is the basis of the 
common properties. The logical relation 
of number to quantity is that of subordina- 
tion ;we cannot pass deductively from the 
former to the latter, but we can pass de- 
ductively from the latter to the former. I t  
is easy to pass downwards from quantity to 
number; the difficulty is in  passing up-
wards from number to quantity. 
The most elaborate treatise on algebra 
written in the English language within re- 
cent times is Chrystal's ' Text-book of Al- 
gebra,' published in two volumes. The 
task which the author sets before himself is 
the same as that which Peacock undertook 
-namely, to place the teaching of the ele- 
ments of algebra on a scientific basis, and 
abreast of what may be called the technical 
knowledge of the day. I n  the first volume 
he starts out with the idea of building up 
the science on the three laws of association, 
commutation and distribution, the two 
former being applicable to addition and 
subtraction, multiplication and division, 
and the third to multiplication. The view 
which he takes of these laws is expressed 
by the phrase ' canons of the science,' as  is 
evidenced by the following passage : As 
we have now completed the establishment 
of the fundamental laws of ordinary al-
gebra, i t  may be well to insist once more 
upon the exact position which they hold in 
the science. To speak, as is sometimes 
done, of the proof of these laws in all their 
generality is an abuse of terms. They are 
simply laid down as the canons of the sci- 
ence. Tlie best evidence that this is their 
real position is the fact that algebras are in 
use whose fundamental laws differ from 
those of algebra. I n  the algebra of qua- 
ternions, for example, the law of commuta- 
tion for multiplication and division does 
not hold generally." 
If i t  is an  abuse of terms to speak of the 
proof of these laws why does Hamilton de- 
vote page upon page to the proof of the as- 
sociative law for a product of quaternions? 
He  is not content with laying i t  down as a 
canon ; he investigates whether i t  corre-
sponds to nature. No doubt, the function 
of the expositor is different from that of the 
investigator ; the latter must establish prin- 
ciples in the best way he can ; the former 
may proceed deductively from these prin- 
ciples as the axioms of the science. Bat  
the idea of 'canon ' involves something ar- 
bitrary and formal which is not involved in 
the idea of an ' axiom.' 
But if we turn to the second volume we 
find evidence against the canonical nature 
of these laws, for the author admits that 
they must be modified within the bounds of 
algebra itself. The law of association can- 
not be applied to the terms of an infinite 
series, unless i t  is convergent ; the law of 
commritation cannot be applied to the terms 
of an infinite series, unless i t  is absolutely 
convergent ; aud the law of distribution re- 
quires modification when applied to the 
product of two infinite series. If, in any 
case, the so-called canons are modified 
there must be some higher authority to 
which appeal is made. The only conclusion 
left is that  the rules in question are not 
canons a t  all, excepting in so far as they 
represent properties of the subject analyzed. 
I may here refer to the prevalent doctrine 
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that  the number-system of arithmetic 
closes with the complex number, and that 
the operations of algebra give no indication 
of any higher imaginary form. For in- 
stance, in an article on 'Monism in Arith- 
metic,' Professor Schubert says : ( (  I n  the 
numerical combination n + ib, which we 
also call number, we have found the 
most general numerical form to which 
the laws of arithmetic can lead, even 
thongh we wished to extend the limits of 
arithmetic still further. * * * With re-
spect to quaternions which many might be 
disposed to regard as new numbers i t  will 
be evident that though quaternions are 
valuable means of investigation in geom- 
try and mechanics they are not numbers of 
arithmetic, becaixse the rules of arithmetic 
are not unconditior~ally applicable to 
them." When the plane of the complex 
quantity is that of the axes of x and y i t  
is true that no higher form appears, because 
in multiplication we get only lc and lcL, which 
is -1. But when IIamilton toolr for the 
common plane a general plane passing 
through the axis of z he immediately en-
countered a higher form jlc, and the prob-
lem resolved itself into finding the meaning 
of that new imaginary combination. He  had 
a great difficulty in emerging out of ( Flat-
land,' but he succeetled in doing it. The 
reason given for excluding the quaternion 
cannot apply, for i t  would exclude infinite 
series, as  the rules of arithmetic are not 
unconditionally applicable to them. 
Last year there appeared the first volume 
of a ' Treatise on Universal Algebra,' by 
Mr. Whitehead, of Trinity College, Cam- 
bridge. By nniversal algebra the author 
means the various systems of symbolic 
reasoning allied to ordinary algebra, the 
chief examples being Hamilton's Quater-
nions, Grassmann's Calculus of Extension 
and Boole's Symbolic Logic. The author 
does not include ordinary algebra in his 
treatment, and the main idea of the work 
is not unification of the methods, nor 
generalization of algebra so as to include 
them, but a detailed study of each structure, 
to be followed by a comparative anatomy. 
I n  this idea of comparative anatomy there 
is involved the assumption that these 
methods are essentially distinct and inde- 
pendent. But that they overlap to a large 
extent is very evident. 
The author preaches the view of the ex- 
treme formalist ; nevertheless, a t  various 
places he makes admissions which are very 
damaging to it. As regards the fundamental 
rnles lie says : ( (  The justification of the 
rnles of inference in any branch of' mathe- 
matics is not properly part of mathematics; 
i t  is the business of experience or philoso- 
phy. Tlle business of mathematics is simply 
to follow the rules. I n  this sense all mathe- 
matical reasoning is necessary; namely, i t  
has followed the rule." Must the mathe- 
matician wait for the experimenter or the 
philosopher to justify the rules of algebra? 
Was i t  no part of Hamilton's business to  
test whether the associative law is true ofa  
product of spherical quaternions ? To ad- 
vance the principles of analysis is surely tlie 
special work of the mathematician ; to fol- 
low the rules discovered is work of a lower 
order. 
Mr. Whitehead thus describes a calculus : 
( 'I n  order that reasoning may be conducted 
by means of substitutive signs it is necessary 
that rules be given for the manipulation of 
the signs. The rilles should be such that 
the final state of the signs after a series of 
operations according to rule denotes, when 
the signs are interpreted in terms of the 
things for which they are substituted, a 
proposition true for the things represented 
by the signs. The ar t  of manipulation of 
substitutive signs according to fixed rules, 
and of the deduction therefrom of true 
propositions, is a calculus." By substitutive 
sign is meant one such that in thought i t  
takes the place of that for which it is sub- 
stituted. He  quotes with approval a saying 
of Stout's that a word is an instrument for 
thinking about the meaning which i t  ex- 
presses, whereas a substitutive sign is a 
means of not thinking about the meaning 
which i t  symbolizes ; and he adds that the 
use of substitutive signs in reasoning is to 
economize thought. 
I t  seems to me that a sign economizes 
thought in precisely the same way that a 
word economizes thought, but to greater 
degree. A word is introdoced to dispense 
with a long phrase or description, and in 
using the word one no more thinks of its 
meaning than in using an algebraic symbol 
does one think of the particular meaning it 
is made to stand for, for the time being. 
There seems to be a lurking fallacy that 
thought is economized by dispensing with 
it altogether. I prefer the saying of Clif- 
ford, with reference to ( a  + b )' = a" 22b 
+ b2 and its expression in English : L L  TWO 
things may be observed on this comparison 
-first, how very much the shorthand ex-
pression gains in clearness from its brevity; 
secondly, that i t  is only shorthand for 
something which is just straightforward 
common sense and nothing else. We may 
always depend upon i t  that algebra which 
cannot be translated into good English and 
sound common sense is bad algebra." 
I n  his statement of the fundamental 
principles of algebra Whitehead follows 
Grassmann to a large extent. He  divides 
them into two classes, the general and the 
special ; the former apply to the whole of 
ordinary and universal algebra ; the latter 
apply to special branches only. The gen- 
eral principles are as  follows : Addition 
follows the commutative and associative 
laws ; multiplication follows the distribu. 
tive law, but does not necessarily follow the 
commutative and associative laws. The 
theory looks beautiful and plausible, but it 
does not 'stand the test of comparison with 
actual analysis, for quaternions is one of 
the principal branches of universal algebra, 
and in i t  the addition of indices is in gen- 
eral non-commutative, and the power of a 
binomial of indices is not formed after the 
distributive law. 
But in addition to this formal bond we 
find in the book another bond uniting the 
several parts into one whole. I n  the pref- 
ace Mr. Whitehead says : "The idea of a 
generalized conception of space has been 
made prominent in the belief that the prop- 
erties and operations involved in i t  can be 
made to form a uniform method of inter- 
pretation of the various algebras. Thus it 
is hoped in this work to exhibit the alge- 
bras, both as systems of symbolism and also 
as engines for the investigation of the pos- 
sibilities of thought and reasoning con-
nected with the abstract general idea of 
space." The chance for any arbitrary sys- 
tem of symbolism applying to anything 
real is very small, as  the author admits; 
for he' says that the entities created by con- 
ventional definitions must have properties 
which bear some affinity to the properties 
of existing things. Unless the affinity or 
correspondence is perfect, how can the one 
apply to the other? How can this perfect 
correspondence be secured, except by the 
conventions being real definitions, the equa- 
tions true propositions and the rules expres- 
sions of universal properties ? The placing 
of the algebra of logic on a space basis has 
been criticised, but in reply i t  may be 
pointed out that logicians have been accus- 
tomed ever since the time of Euler to 
prove their principal theorems by means of 
diagrams. 
Our conclusion about the fundamental 
rules of algebra i s :  I f  the elements of a 
sum or of a product are independent of 
order, then the written order of the terms 
is indifferent, and the product of two such 
snms is the sum of the partial produots ; 
but when the elements of a sum or o£ a 
product have a real order, then the written 
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order of the elements must be preserved 
though the manner of their association may 
be indifferent, and a power of a binomial is 
then different from a product. This ap- 
plies whether the sum or product occurs 
simply or as the index of a base. 
Descartes wedded algebra to geometry; 
formalism tends to divorce them. The prog- 
ress of mathematics within the century 
has been from formalism towards realism ; 
and in the coming century, i t  may be pre- 
dicted, symbolism will more and more give 
place to notation, conventions to principles 
and loose extensions to rigorous generaliza- 
tions. 
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THE Botanical Club met in the room as- 
signed for the meetings of Section G pursu- 
ant to the resolution adopted by the Boston 
meeting, Tuesday morning a t  9 o'clock, Dr. 
Byron D. Halsted presiding. The sessions 
were continued a t  that hour each morning, 
and completed by a meeting a t  1:30 p. m., 
Thursday. I n  the absence of the Secre- 
tary, A. D. Selby was chosen Secretary pro 
tempore. 
The attendance and interest in the pro- 
ceedings of the Club were very satisfactory. 
The number of papers read was quite equal 
to the time secured for them. 
Under the title 'A Greasewood Compass 
Plant,' Dr. C. E. Bessey reported that on 
the high, western Nebraska foot-hills st 
shrubby species of Xclrcobatus was observed 
to bear its leaves in an upright position, 
with their blades parallel to the meridian. 
Specimens were obtained for microscopic ex- 
amination. 
The same author gave an  account of 'A 
Visit to the Original Station of the Rydberg 
Cottonwood.' ''This species (Populus acu-
minata Ryd.) was discovered a few years 
ago in Roubedean Township, in Scott's Bluff 
County, in western Nebraska, in Carter 
Cafion. This is a broad cafion bounded by 
high pine-covered buttes, and in the bottom 
of the broad cafion is a narrower one fringed 
with deciduous trees-box elder, elm, cot- 
tonwood, willow, plum, red cedar, etc., and 
anlong them are clumps of the Rydberg 
cottonwood. The trees are symmetrical 
and of much greater beauty than those of 
the common cottonwood. When old the  
bark of the trunk is light-colored and very 
deeply fissured. 
Dr. N. L. Britton reported to the Club 
that Mr. and Mrs. A. A. Heller, who were 
sent to Porto Rico last winter as  collectors 
for the New York Botanical Garden, had 
returned, having secured about 1,400 num- 
bers, representing probably over 1,200 spe- 
cies, and over 6,000 specimens of plants. 
They are now being studied. 
Dr. William Saunders gave a brief ac-
count of The Arboretum and Botanic Gar- 
den of the Central Experimental Farm a t  
Ottawa, Canada, established in 1889.' Dur-
ing that year 200 species and varieties of 
woody plants were planted in botanical 
groups. Additions were made from year t o  
year, and by the end of 1894 the collection 
included about 600 different species a,nd 
varieties. Since 1894 progress has been 
much more rapid, and up to the present 
time the total number of species under test 
or which have been tested is 3,071-of these 
1,465 have been found hardy, 320 half 
hardy, 229 tender, 307 winter-killed and 
740 have not been tested long enough 
to admit of an opinion on their hardiness. 
Where specimens pass the winter unin-
jured, or with very small injury to the tips 
of the branches only, they are classed a s  
hardy. When killed back one-fourth to 
one-half, half-hardy ; when killed to the 
snow-line, tender. A considerable collec- 
